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O objecto deste texto, relativo a um projecto de pesquisa em curso, é propôr a aná-
lise das leituras que fi zeram Karl Popper e Leo Strauss da fi losofi a política de Platão. 
Muito distintos entre si, ambos os pensadores viram contudo na Républica uma das 
mais poderosas críticas da democracia e construíram interpretações e argumentos 
polémicos em confronto com Platão.
Hoje há também dois “relatos” que colocam em questão a democracia. O primeiro 
tem a sua origem nas ciências sociais, que constatam certos defeitos inerentes ao 
sistema: assimetria de informação e problemas de agência entre governantes e 
governados. O outro, antes mediático ou popular partilha com o anterior a crítica 
dos mecanismos de decisão democráticos, mas acrescenta-lhe uma visão extrema 
da política e dos políticos democráticos que justifi ca a apatia senão o desprezo de 
tudo o que é político.
As duas leituras, de Popper e de Strauss, por muito diferentes que sejam, partilham 
entre si certos traços como o anti-historicismo, a não neutralidade axiológica,  um 
certo racionalismo (crítico ou zetético). Procuraremos sugerir neste texto que pos-
suem o poder de alargar, no tempo e no espaço, o horizonte dos debates sobre os 
“regimes constitucionais - pluralistas” contemporâneos. 
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Th e purpose of this paper, that refl ects an ongoing research, is to suggest the useful-
ness of an analysis of the readings of Karl Popper and Leo Strauss on Plato’s political 
philosophy. Very diff erent as they are, both thinkers saw in the Republic one of the 
most powerful critics of democracy and built interpretations and polemic argu-
ments by contrast with Plato’s arguments.
Th ere are currently two arguments questioning liberal or constitutional democracy. 
Th e fi rst originates in the social sciences, which point out a number of defects that 
are innate in the system: asymmetry in information and agency problems between 
governors and governed. Th e other is rather popular or media-based but it shares 
with the fi rst the criticism of democratic decision-making mechanisms albeit add-
ing an extreme view of politics and politicians that justifi es apathy or even con-
tempt for everything that is “political”. 
Th e two interpretations, by Popper and Strauss, diff erent as they are, also share with 
each other certain characteristics like anti-historicism, axiological non-neutrality 
and a certain (critical or zetetic) rationalism. We consider that they have the ability 
to widen, temporally and spatially, the horizon of the debates about contemporary 
regimes and democracy.
Keywords: Democracy, political legitimacy, Plato, Karl Popper, Leo Strauss. 
1. Democracy and its discontents 
Th ere are currently two arguments questioning liberal or constitutional 
democracy. Th e fi rst originates in the social sciences, which point out a 
number of defects that are innate in the system: asymmetry in informa-
tion and agency problems between governors and governed, concessions to 
Populism, cyclical instability, short-sightedness, poor turnouts at elections, 
capture of the system by bureaucrats or interest groups, etc.. Th e other is 
rather popular or media-based but it shares with the fi rst the criticism of 
democratic decision-making mechanisms albeit adding an extreme view of 
politics and politicians that justifi es apathy or even contempt for everything 
that is “political”.
In fact it could appear to anyone reading the papers nowadays that 
democracy is under fi re precisely at the moment of its greatest expansion. 
It has apparently more friends on the outside than convinced fans on the 
inside. It is still unsure whether the recent changes taking place in Arab 
countries will come to represent the fourth wave of democratisation, but 
what does already seem to be diffi  cult to deny is that democracy is also 
seducing the Islamic world, in spite of all the theories about the “cultural” 
requisites or social preconditions for democracy. 
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On the contrary, at the same time, within the West the eff ectiveness 
of democratic governments is being questioned. Non-elected entities (the 
IMF, ECB, etc.), even if not amounting to a suspension of democracy as 
such, seem to be necessary for obtaining certain results. Th at is, democ-
racy needs to be sacrifi ced temporarily, because electoral cycles lead to 
such political short-sightedness, or inconsistency in policies, that it does 
not have suffi  cient resources for overcoming “the crisis”, etc.[1]. 
Aft er all, these criticisms are not new. Th e diff erence is that, previously, 
those who defended the superiority of non-democratic solutions did it in 
the name of central planning and against the more or less free markets that 
proliferated in political democracies. Today it seems that we have to choose 
between democracy and submission to the markets. Th e alignments are dif-
ferent. But, before, even those recognising that a certain success, or a cer-
tain optimism about the results and a minimum of eff ectiveness on the part 
of governments, were needed to legitimise democracies, remembered that 
anyone not prepared to pay the price of his freedom loses it quickly. 
In addition, those disaff ected with democracy do not stop at questions 
of eff ectiveness. Not only does the quality of those elected, or of the political 
“class”, get criticised. Both from the left , which feels a certain nostalgia for 
forms of direct democracy, or even the masses in the streets, and from the 
right, responding to populist worries typical of a “closed society”, one hears 
prognostications about the fortunes of democracy, which invariably proph-
esy social tumults, when not appealing to the revolt of new generations 
without a place in the “system”. Or there is even a search for alternatives to 
constitutional democracy (and a request, for example, for “true democracy 
now”), while at the same time it is pointed out that party-based democracy 
does not have an exclusive on legitimacy.
One possible reaction for a democrat is to defend that the system that 
allows free refl ection, should not be questioned: among “gentlemen”, in a 
civilized society, democracy is just not for discussion. Th is is a reaction that 
is British in style, if not in substance; something like saying that a society 
is decent, in order to avoid high-sounding words like justice or excellence. 
But what exactly does this way of underrating the problem mean? It means, 
in part, that we have spent too long analysing the defects of democracy and 
too little time remembering that it needs to be cherished. And that per-
1   I have already tried to clip the wings of certain attempts to “scientifi cally” justify this false need 
in the critical book I wrote about Public Choice, entitled Votos, governos e mercados (Votes, 
governments and markets), but probably too timidly.
Diacritica 26-2_Filosofia.indb   211 02-02-2013   15:29:10
212 JOSÉ COLEN
haps the extreme view of democracy, that we have tried to describe, has at 
present become the normal one.
2. Karl Popper, Leo Strauss and the crisis of our times
Another possible reaction, however, is to seriously discuss the ideas of those 
disaff ected with democracy, which have been with us for a long time, because 
they are also part of Western tradition. Th is, in spite of the enormous diff er-
ences between them, was the reaction of two philosophers of the last century: 
Karl Popper and Leo Strauss. Both thought and wrote at a moment in which 
liberal democracies seemed to be obsolete systems, destined to perish.
In a similar environment a liberal can feel, as Karl Popper describes 
when writing the preface to the second edition of Th e Open society, like 
a voice from the past, speaking against an implacable wind that sends his 
words back to him, because he is unable to descry any reference point with 
which he can defend democracy, or the rights of man, in a non-democratic 
country, if it is not its tradition or the conviction of the majority, or the most 
representative part thereof. Nation, language, citizenship, rights, justice and 
even rationality are historical and always belong to a tradition.
Leo Strauss shared this sentiment. When he introduced himself to the 
students and teaching team at Chicago University in Autumn 1949, with his 
conferences on “Natural right and history”, he declared that the “self-evident 
truths” of the father’s of the American constitution risked being devalued 
to just another interesting piece of antiquity, or even some antique trinket, 
speaking in the name of a civilisation that is declining, tottering and unsure 
of itself, falling into a disqualifi ed relativism. 
Even though he seldom took public positions on concrete political ques-
tions, nobody would confuse these warning calls by Strauss with the words 
of a “last liberal”, like Popper, worried with the minimising of suff ering, the 
possibility of deposing governments pacifi cally and the open society[2]. 
2  What makes it possible today to immediately see Leo Strauss as a conservative, of a certain type, 
is the embarrassing way in which he spoke of things such as: natural law, virtue, magnanim-
ity, the failure of leaderships, the duties of citizenship, excellence, morality or the hierarchy 
of goods. He even went so far as to suggest that there was perhaps some type of criterion for 
distinguishing between good and evil, loft y and degenerate ends, a statesman and a despot. 
Nowadays it is impossible to talk about such things without seeming to belong to a world that 
has disappeared. It would even be a little disturbing: if we accepted that there are loft y or degen-
erate ends, it might turn out that freedom of religion and sexual orientation were not based on 
“equally legitimate ultimate ends”; if the ultimate purpose of a society was the “excellence” of 
its members, it would be possible to justify public policies discriminating Opera from Hip hop 
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3. The spell of Plato: is democracy still a philosophical problem?
Popper’s and Strauss’ agendas and even their ideals were, thus, very diff er-
ent. Curiously, nevertheless, both chose to explore their ideals by compar-
ing them with Plato. 
It was at diff erent moments of their lives, with many parallels, that they 
elucidated or explored Plato’s texts. Popper, who considered himself a man 
of the Enlightenment, wrote especially when he was young: almost every-
thing he published on the question was fi nished before he was forty. Until 
he was about forty Strauss preferred to dedicate himself to studying the 
moderns, and the majority of his academic output on Plato only appeared 
at the end of his life: aft er he was sixty fi ve he hardly wrote about anything 
except “the Problem of Socrates” and the philosophical and historical ques-
tions related to this.
Certainly their interpretations are very diff erent, even irreconcilable. 
But as many have already pointed out, they have more than one common 
enemy on the other side of the inkwell: tyranny, historicism, logical positiv-
ism, Hegel, Nietzsche. In fact, if they fi ght over interpretations it is because 
both of them judge that it behoves to take Plato’s assertions “seriously” and 
they throw overboard any pretensions to “axiological neutrality”, to talk 
face to face with this great thinker from a remote, if not tribal, past. Both 
agree that the Republic contains one of the most devastating critiques of 
democracy.
Evidently, while Popper concludes that the most urgent thing is to bury 
Plato, Strauss suggests that we need to go back to the classics. Popper asserts 
that this is necessary for maintaining progress towards an open society; 
Strauss that it is necessary in order to avoid a universal state.
Th ese two modern interpretations of Plato are among the most famous 
and almost no current bibliography ignores them completely, although 
classicists tend to consider them marginal, if not anachronistic: the qual-
ity of Popper’s erudition is disputed, whereas that of Strauss is rarely ques-
tioned, even if, some say, it suff ers from serious methodological and stylistic 
songs, whether their words encourage delinquency or not; if it was possible to justify attributes 
for a politician or a general such as cruel or disastrous, it might seem that there is a defence for 
“value judgements”, capable of distinguishing the Swiss Republic from a black despot, contrary 
to what Hans Kelsen suggested. Now, this is something we are not inclined to concede easily. 
In the public arena, in intellectual milieus, in a university or on the television it is a given that 
all cultural manifestations are equal and, as to the rest, they are just very debatable value judge-
ments. (See references in this magazine, pp.  xxx-xxx).
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defects. In fact, both handle Plato’s ideas as if they were contemporary and 
not with a love for the antique.
Both interpretations startle us because they presuppose that there is a 
way of approaching democracy that is not what is characteristic of empiri-
cal sociology: measuring inequalities, counting votes by social class, sex or 
profession, studying forms of participation and appurtenance, etc.. Th ey 
believe that there is a characteristically philosophical way of dealing with 
political regimes, based on a view of the whole. Which should not, aft er all, 
be a surprise, since the regime problem is one of the oldest of all political 
philosophy problems. 
Can one discuss the question of “best regime” in absolute terms, inde-
pendently of the circumstances of time and place? Is the delineation of 
political institutions a genuine philosophical problem? Today we perhaps 
think that philosophy should deal with more abstract things: happiness, 
freedom, recognition, values or ideas of justice. Which means that, in spite 
of the optimism that seemed to temporarily sweep through academic cir-
cles, Rawls’ return to the question of justice was not enough to close the 
gulf that had opened in the twentieth century between “desirability” and 
“feasibility”.
In this abyss a by no means small role is played by ignorance of politi-
cal questions from the perspective of the citizen and the statesman, in 
favour of a more geometric, formalisable approach using models with 
higher chambers composed of three senators, waiting lists that are math-
ematised but empty in their core, and correlations between economic 
development and political stability. Ministerial cabinets, political speeches 
or the common good do not belong to the enchanted circle of new politi-
cal science except as epiphenomena (whether as the result of the decline 
of the middle class or of the positioning of the parties in Hotelling’s con-
tinuum, etc.). 
We follow the hypothesis that it is still possible to learn from Plato’ 
critique, the most devastating critique of democracy, just as how Popper or 
Strauss studied it. Th e replies they formulated, they who were among the 
“friends of democracy” but not among its adulators, perhaps make it pos-
sible to see this problem with particular perspicacity, the fruit of the special 
circumstances in which they lived[3]. 
3  Th is idea nevertheless exasperated Strauss, who considered that philosophers are not children 
of their time but, at most, adoptive or step-children little loved by their time.
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4. Methodological problems: appropriation and the “state of  
    the art” of research into Plato
Appropriating words and ideas conceived in other circumstances, even 
when the cultural distance separating us does not appear insurmountable, 
is not a task without problems. And using these authors as guides for read-
ing Plato seems a really problematical enterprise.
Th e Cambridge school, which usually defi nes itself with the term “New 
history of philosophical thought”  (Pocock, Quentin Skinner, John Duhn, 
Peter Laslett, etc.) notes that the history of political thought is an activ-
ity “with its head in the present”, appropriating the writings of the great 
thinkers to extract profi t for the present moment. Th ese authors considered 
the process reprehensible: “we should learn to think by ourselves” (Skinner, 
1969) and aim to completely separate history from thought and treat “the 
political thought phenomenon as a strictly historical one.” (Ibidem)
Th e texts studied by an historian, they suggest, always require some 
type of explanation or refl ection and a historian is constantly tempted, by 
the nature of the material, to interpret or correct it, i.e. in a non-historical 
way. Th is temptation needs to be resisted. Th ey in fact defend the opposite 
of the immersion that Isaiah Berlin, or romantics before him, suggested 
to historians. Th e danger is that historians end up creating not so much 
history as a de-contextualised philosophical reconstruction. Are Popper or 
Strauss really listening to Plato? Or inventing their own version?
Plato wrote fi rst and foremost dialogues, in which various philosophers 
appear to us in conversation with non-philosophers. Th e participants vary 
but Socrates is almost always present, although not always actively. Th e 
opinions expressed by Plato’s main voices, even Socrates, are not always 
identical. Researchers into Plato from the 19th Century onwards oft en fol-
lowed F. Schleiermacher’s approach by interpreting these dialogues in terms 
of the “development” of his thought over time[4]. And many 20th Century 
researchers adopted an (essentially speculative) “chronology of composi-
tion”, as opposed to the previous unitary interpretation (e. g. Shorey, 1903; 
Von Harnim, 1914: cfr. Kahn, 1996), in part because they were thus able to 
explain this varying of the positions of Plato’s spokesmen.
Classicists in general agree that there are dialogues from when Plato was 
young, like the Apology and Crito, in which the “historical” Socrates refutes 
the other speakers, dialogues from the middle period, like the Phaedo and 
the Republic, in which Plato ascribes his own ideas to his master and, fi nally, 
4 Taylor (2001), Grote (2004-5) and Gregory Vlastos (1991) and Idem (1981). Cfr. Zuckert (2009).
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dialogues from Plato’s last period, in which he prefers to ascribe his most 
mature philosophical ideas to other characters – except only for the Phile-
bus (Cfr: Khan, 1996).
Cambpell and Dittenberger carried out pioneer work, which led to 
much “stylometric” research in which particular details in his writing 
(changes and similarities) are used to perform a “comparative dating”. Th is 
dating presupposes a chronology based on the contents of his ideas in cer-
tain reference works (Ledger, 1989; Brandwood, 1990). Some particulars, in 
fact, link Plato’s Crítias, Laws, Philebus, Statesman, Sophist and Timaeus to 
each other (Th esleff , 2009) [5].
Various researchers have recently recalled that there is no ancient source 
suggesting any radical changes in Plato’s thought (e. g. Dorter, 1994). It is 
also acknowledged nowadays that, in general, Aristotle is a problematical 
guide to the interpretation of Plato[6]. 
5. Two interpretations of Plato’s program
Karl Popper adopts the received chronology, generally defended at the 
beginning of the 20th Century, and resolutely distinguishes between the 
thought of Socrates and Plato, interpreting Plato’s political works in terms 
of a totalitarian program. Th is theory, which was much criticised at the 
time, was also defended later, with nuances, by Klosko and others (Cfr. 
Klosko, 2006; Bobonich, 2008).
In spite of the doubts he sometimes expresses, Leo Strauss does not 
diff er essentially as regards the dating, but considers that Plato generally 
follows Socrates’ program and, in particular, that it is necessary to pay 
attention to the  dramatic context in the dialogues, given that he, unlike 
Aristotle, did not write treatises. And he generally tends to interpret Plato’s 
political writings in the light of a conception of the whole that is fundamen-
tally sceptical. 
Th e Republic is, thus, in the fi rst case a totalitarian blueprint and in 
the second a utopian composition which shows the limitations there are in 
political solutions in a somewhat comical way. What both take seriously is 
the contents of Plato’s proposals and arguments: in one case refuting them, 
and in the other learning from his pointing out of the limits of the political.
5  Th esleff  nevertheless shows that the affi  nity does not point to any comparative dating; the 
(almost) only indication for a comparative dating is that Th e Laws were written in wax.
6  Excellent debates on all these questions in Annas and Rowe (2002).
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Th e two interpretations, by Popper and Strauss, diff erent as they are, 
also share with each other certain characteristics like anti-historicism, axi-
ological non-neutrality and a certain (critical or zetetic) rationalism. We 
consider that they have the ability to widen, temporally and spatially, the 
horizon of the debates about contemporary regimes and democracy.
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